Islamic NATO? Saudi Arabia reshapes Middle East's alliance map to set new regional rules
Opinion:
Riyadh’s pivot toward Turkey, Qatar and Pakistan, growing assertiveness in Yemen and Sudan and frustration with US guarantees show Saudi Arabia is no longer just hedging risks but actively redefining the Middle East balance of power
By Dr.
Yoel Guzansky
Saudi Arabia is working to build an alternative
network of strategic backstops as it confronts growing uncertainty in its
relationship with the United States, concerns over
Israel’s rising power and unpredictability, and the need to reinforce its
regional standing.
he kingdom
no longer relies solely on its traditional partnership framework. Instead, it
is seeking out new actors, including former rivals, that can provide security
capabilities, strategic flexibility and economic and industrial value. The aim
is to reduce Saudi vulnerability in an increasingly complex and competitive
regional environment.
Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman
A first step
in this direction is an emerging security agreement that includes the potential
purchase of Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 fighter jets. The deal would allow Saudi
Arabia to expand its deterrence capabilities and give substance to the defense
agreement it signed with Pakistan in September 2025, following the Israeli
strike in Qatar.
At the same
time, reports point to the possible integration of Turkey into this emerging
framework, creating what some describe as a kind of “Islamic NATO.” Such a
structure would offer a flexible response to regional threats: Pakistan brings
an operational nuclear capability, Turkey a large conventional military and
industrial base, and Saudi Arabia vast financial resources, diplomatic clout
and religious legitimacy as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites.
These moves
are not merely a reaction to rising regional uncertainty. They are also part of
a broader effort to reshape the regional order and preserve Saudi Arabia’s
leading position at the expense of the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi is
increasingly seen in Riyadh not only as an economic competitor but as a state
working, alongside Israel, to undermine core Saudi interests, particularly in
the Red Sea arena.
The warming
of ties with Turkey and Qatar at the UAE’s expense, deepening security and
economic cooperation with Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia’s growing assertiveness in
Yemen and Sudan all point to a kingdom acting not just in self-defense, but
with the ambition to redraw alliance patterns and rewrite the regional rules of
the game.
During Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s most recent visit to Washington, he was greeted
with considerable ceremony, and the host even pledged to sell Saudi Arabia
advanced F-35 fighter jets, a move important to the crown prince’s prestige and
status. Yet bin Salman has grown wary of promises alone. He has yet to secure
what he truly wants from President Donald Trump: a formal defense treaty and a
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.
That gap
underscores, in Riyadh’s view, the need for additional backing and for building
a multilayered partnership network. The potential inclusion of Pakistan and
Turkey in a new transregional framework reflects a classic hedging strategy,
allowing Saudi Arabia to navigate rising uncertainty while signaling to
Washington that it has alternatives.
Over the
past five years, bin Salman focused on reducing regional tensions and pursuing
détente, primarily with Iran, to concentrate on implementing his ambitious
Vision 2030 economic reform plan. Now, he appears confident enough to once
again attempt to shape the regional order.
There is
also a personal dimension. Bin Salman wants to restore Saudi Arabia’s perceived
rightful place in the Arab hierarchy, not only as king of Saudi Arabia, but as
the leading Arab power.
Saudi Arabia
is not merely seeking improved defensive capabilities. It is redefining itself
as a central regional actor, expanding its room for maneuver and moving away
from outdated assumptions of rigid, dichotomous camps toward a new strategic
reality.
Israel is
not part of this vision. In Riyadh, there is growing disillusionment with an
Israeli government seen as unwilling to meet what the kingdom considers a
minimum threshold, namely a pathway toward a Palestinian state. Moreover, Saudi
Arabia’s recent moves, and the potential alignment with Qatar and Turkey, could
place Saudi Arabia and Israel on opposite sides of an emerging regional divide.
Dr. Yoel
Guzansky is head of the Gulf Program at the Institute for National Security
Studies and a former official at Israel’s National Security Council.
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