How Systemic Gaps Left Texans Exposed in Deadly Flood, and What Happens Next
State lawmakers are expected to consider a variety of improvements this week.
Two weeks after flash floods tore through Texas Hill Country, a sobering set of questions lingers: What went wrong — and how can it be prevented from happening again? As the community grieves, scrutiny deepens and shifts from nature’s fury to human responsibility.
Governor Greg Abbott has called a special legislative session, set to begin Monday, to address shortcomings in Texas’s emergency response and flood mitigation systems. Topics expected on the table include public alert infrastructure, preemptive evacuation standards, and community-based response coordination.
At the federal level, FEMA — which is under scrutiny for failing to return thousands of calls from those affected by the flooding due to staff cuts — is still assessing long-term damage and recovery needs. The scale of the disaster, however, may reopen Congressional debate about proactive versus reactive disaster funding.
A spokesperson for the National Weather Service tells the New York Sun that their current focus is on “recovery efforts,” and that “conversations about steps forward will happen in the coming weeks.”
President Trump surveyed the area last week and acknowledged the unprecedented nature of the event, saying, “A thing like this has never happened,” and promised that state authorities would “figure something out.” Mr. Abbott added that officials are working to “devise a response” tailored to the community and are considering improvements to the alert system.
As recovery continues, residents and officials are left grappling with what might have been prevented — and what must change. Because in a region defined by its rivers, it’s no longer a question of if the next flood will come, but whether the warnings will arrive in time.
Dean’s Professor of Resilience and Director of the Resilience Studies Program at Northeastern University, Daniel Aldrich, tells the Sun that long-term reforms should include “updating outdated federal flood maps that misrepresented risk, installing automated river gauge systems with sirens, and establishing mandatory evacuation protocols for high-risk zones.”
He also emphasizes the need for better regional coordination between camps, RV parks, and emergency services, as well as rebuilding trust between residents and officials — trust that has been eroded by widespread misinformation about federal agencies.
President and co-owner of hazard and disaster management firm Early Alert, William Wagner, also emphasized the importance of state and local emergency management agencies implementing “robust public awareness campaigns to educate residents about all-hazard preparedness.”
“Partnering with local organizations, tribal authorities, and community leaders is essential to ensure alerts and preparedness information are shared through trusted, accessible channels,” Mr. Wagner tells the Sun. “Regular joint drills and tabletop simulations that mimic real flash flood scenarios can help reinforce a faster, more coordinated response when every second counts.”
Getting to the Bottom
Almost immediately after the flood, speculation turned to federal responsibility. Some critics pointed to long-term staffing shortages at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), including a vacancy in the warning coordination role at the New Braunfels office — an official responsible for liaising with local emergency managers.
Meteorologists, however, counter that despite that gap, the office increased staffing to five forecasters — more than double the usual amount.
The United Cajun Navy, one of the leading volunteer relief groups on the ground, stressed that budget cuts to NOAA did not impact the situation in Texas.
Mr. Trump, who has proposed slashing the NOAA’s budget by 27 percent in 2026, denied any connection between budget issues and the flood.
“This is a 100-year catastrophe,” he said, adding that he couldn’t blame the former president, Joe Biden, either.
Flash flooding is not new to the region, and past floods — in 1932 and 1987 — also struck summer camps. After the 1987 incident, alarms were installed in some areas, but Kerr County later declined to build a more comprehensive warning system after a $1 million federal grant application was denied.
The Texas Division of Emergency Management reportedly refused a 2017 request from Kerr County for a warning system as it failed to meet federal requirements. A proposal the following year was also rejected due to state officials prioritizing that spending for counties affected by Hurricane Harvey. This massive storm inundated large parts of Texas in August 2017.
“In 2016, Kerr County contracted for an engineering study on their current warning system and were told it was antiquated and inadequate,” explained Mr. Aldrich. “The county filed for federal assistance via a Hazard Mitigation Grant for $976,000 but was not selected for funding.
“Later, they had over $5 million in ARPA funds in their account, but residents opposed spending federal money from the Biden administration. That decision seems, unfortunately, to have been influenced by politics.”
He stressed that a less-than-a-million-dollar warning system must be weighed against the loss of so many llives and millions in damages.
“Early alerts create a multiplier effect by enabling timely evacuations and reducing search and rescue costs. In the long term, improved preparedness can also lead to lower flood insurance premiums,” Mr. Aldrich continued.
“Finally, we need to think about tourism protection: The area relies heavily on summer camps and tourism. Would you want to send children to an area that has flooded and taken lives in the past, knowing there are inadequate systems in place for their protection?”
In January, a bill that would have created a statewide emergency alert council and infrastructure grant program failed in the Texas Legislature. Lawmakers cited the estimated $500 million cost as prohibitive.
A Communication Breakdown
While some questioned whether federal budget constraints played a role, others point to missed opportunities and delayed decisions closer to home, at the county and state level, where the consequences proved fatal.
Experts increasingly point to breakdowns at the state and local levels — gaps in coordination, communication, and planning that may have made a deadly situation worse.
“Documents reveal that Kerr County officials took nearly six hours to heed calls to send emergency alerts, with the first CodeRED alert not going out until 90 minutes after the initial 4:22 am request, and some messages not arriving until after 10 am,” said Mr. Aldrich.
Importantly, experts point to fixing what many see as a flagrant communication problem between weather authorities and those on the ground.
“Communities should conduct an after-action review, ensure they have warning systems in place, test them and communicate with their communities as to what to do when there is a warning,” Adjunct Professor in Emergency and Disaster Management at Georgetown University, Attila Hertelendy, tells the Sun. “And how time critical it is to take action.”
Though the National Weather Service began warning of heavy rain as early as July 1, and issued flood watches and flash flood warnings on July 3 and into the early morning of July 4, some critics say the “Slight Risk” classification may have underestimated the scale of the disaster.
By the time a rare flash flood emergency was declared for parts of Kerr County around 4 a.m., the flooding was already underway, with local firefighters scrambling to warn nearby residents.
Communication proved problematic. Rural terrain and unreliable cell reception meant many Texans, especially those in remote areas, never received alerts. There were no sirens. No citywide alarms. For many, the first sign of trouble was water rushing through their door.
“The breakdown appears to have occurred not within the NWS itself, but in the failure of local officials to activate the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System and other alert channels quickly enough,” said Mr. Wagner.
“In Kerr County, for example, there was a significant delay in disseminating evacuation alerts — despite NWS warnings already being in effect.”
Among the hardest hit was Camp Mystic, a historic all-girls summer camp perched beside the Guadalupe River. At least 30 of the dead were campers and young counselors. Despite having recently updated emergency protocols, staff had little time to act before cabins were submerged.
Meanwhile, rescuers continue to move through shattered cabins and overturned vehicles. Children’s shoes lay scattered near riverbanks where the water had torn families apart overnight. The confirmed death toll in the Texas Hill Country flash floods has topped over 130, with about 100 still missing — a number expected to rise as recovery teams continue their search.
Texas officials did not respond to requests for further comment.
https://www.nysun.com/article/how-systemic-gaps-left-texans-exposed-in-deadly-flood-and-what-happens-next
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