EU’s Plan to Bolster Own Defence Makes Sense Amid US Foreign Policy Shift
Conrad Black:
The
European Union has just announced an 800 billion-euro expansion of military expenses over the next five years. To
achieve this objective, member states are being excused from observing the EU
guidelines on avoidance of deficit financing, and a special program is being
established by the union itself with a loan of 150 billion euros to individual
members to assist them in meeting newly raised requirements for collective
defense.
This, like
the robust European response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine—which has
largely gone unnoticed due to the Trump administration’s complaints that the
United States has been paying an inordinate share of the cost of the
war—demonstrates that the European ambition to retain its independence and be a
substantial force in the world is greater than was readily appreciated, both in
Russia and North America.
The European Union on balance has been a disappointment.
Twenty years ago, its collective GDP was approximately equal to that of the
United States, and today it is only about half of U.S. GDP. Part of
this uncompetitive result is the defection of the United Kingdom from the EU,
but the great majority of European underperformance is due to overregulation,
excessive taxation, and the compulsive massaging about income in Danegeld to the working class and the small farmer.
The reasons
for this expensive placebo for the masses of Europe can be easily understood by
anyone with even a cursory knowledge of European history. But as the recent
German elections indicate—and even the hesitant efforts of the Macron regime in
France confirm—and as Italian prime minister Giorgio Meloni has proclaimed, a
course correction is necessary to assure European economic growth and a rising
standard of living. Europe is also in desperate need of a higher birth rate
among the majority nationalities, or at least the ability to attract
assimilable immigration, to ensure that the old continent does not succumb to
either geriatric perils or the agitation of immigrant communities actively
hostile to the societies into which they have moved.
The shift in
U.S. foreign policy being enacted by the Trump administration—though it could
have been better enunciated, particularly in respect to Canada—is a logical
response to the evolution of strategic events in the world since the end of the
Cold War 35 years ago.
President
Franklin D. Roosevelt knew Western Europe well and was fluent in French and
German, and his family’s considerable fortune was derived from trading in the
Far East. Roosevelt saw that if there wasn’t an American presence in Western
Europe and the Far East, the entire mass of Eurasia would be in danger of
falling into the hands of regimes hostile to democracy, and the security of the
Americas would be at risk every generation. He was the chief architect of the
strategy that led to the Soviet Union bearing a disproportionate burden in
World War II. Among the Big Three allied powers—the USSR, USA, and British
Empire—the Soviet Union endured over 90 percent of the casualties and 95
percent of the physical damage in subduing Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, the
Anglo-Americans occupied or liberated France, Italy, Japan, and most of
Germany, and the USSR gained a temporary and widely resented occupation of
Eastern European countries of lesser strategic value, which they were committed
to evacuate.
The allied
powers pledged at Tehran and Yalta to assure absolutely free democratic
elections in all liberated countries and to evacuate all of them except
Germany. The Western allies fulfilled their pledges, the Soviet Union did not,
and the Cold War began. But with a strong American presence in Western Europe
and the Far East, the American-devised strategy of “containment” of the Soviet Union was successful, and the
Communist Bloc disintegrated after 45 years without a shot being exchanged
between it and the Western powers. The United States devised the successful
containment strategy and implemented it, but it must be said that allied
leaders contributed importantly to the victory of the West. Margaret Thatcher,
Pope John Paul II, Helmut Kohl, Francois Mitterand, Brian Mulroney, and in
their time, Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, and Giulio Andreotti all
contributed importantly to the Western victory in the Cold War.
The United
States has no natural ambition to be involved in other parts of the world; its
only concern is not to be threatened. Unlike empires built on steady expansion
like Rome or colonial projection like Britain and France, the United States
populated and developed the great center of North America, but beyond that has
never remained long in any place where its presence was not desired, as it
demonstrated in Cuba and the Philippines. It has absolutely no desire to
maintain a large military presence in Europe, and only did so to keep potential
threats far away from its own shores. That was a strategic policy that
commended itself in days when Germany was, as far as the Anglo-French
democracies were concerned, an unreliable and potentially dangerous country. It
was long a truism to say that Germany was too late unified, had never
determined if it was an Eastern or Western-facing country, and could not assure
its own security without frightening or violating its neighbors.
President
Eisenhower overcame the resistance of Mr. Churchill and of the French
government in bringing West Germany into NATO and approving its partial
rearmament in 1954–55. President Reagan and President George H.W. Bush were
essential to the reunification of Germany, which Prime Minister Thatcher,
President Mitterand, and President Gorbachev favored; only the United States
had no fear of a united Germany. Now that Germany is comfortable in the cocoon
of economic and military allies, and all the states that were its mortal
enemies to the West are its allies now, Western Europe has four or five times
the economic strength of a Russia that only contains half of the population of
the old Soviet Union. And Western Europe can easily match and surpass Russia in
military capacity.
The United
States is now responding to the threat from China, as it did to the threat from
the Soviet Union, by assembling a containment strategy. To be maximally
effective, this will include Russia as well as India, Japan, South Korea,
Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and, depending
on events, Taiwan. Europe and America, though their relations should always be
cordial, do not need each other as they did when the USSR was threatening all
of them. Europe is not a serious force in the Pacific, and its military role
should now be to ensure the security of Western and Central Europe and maintain
a general alliance with the advanced countries of the Commonwealth, the United
States, and its Pacific allies. Ideally, NATO would be reconfigured as a
worldwide defensive alliance of democratic countries.
But in the
meantime, Europe is absolutely correct to assure its own defense—which it has
the means and the technical ability to do—and those European countries that
wish political integration should achieve it while those that wish to retain
their sovereignty should do so in alliance with federal Europe, the UK, as well
as Canada and the United States.
https://www.newenglishreview.org/eus-plan-to-bolster-own-defence-makes-sense-amid-us-foreign-policy-shift/
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