CCP ‘Golden Shares. ’Toronto Laundering Command, Mexican-Chinese Cash Collectors, and TD Bank: Inside the Global Fentanyl Trade
WASHINGTON — In an exclusive, deeply detailed interview, a senior U.S. government expert with oversight of thousands of high-level transnational crime investigations—from El Chapo to more sophisticated Chinese crime lords, including billionaires with direct ties to the Chinese government, strategically based in Mexican and Canadian cities—has revealed unprecedented insights into Canada’s pivotal role in the People’s Republic of China’s global fentanyl trafficking and money laundering apparatus.
The
expert’s account includes sensitive findings from the TD Bank fentanyl
laundering probe, a case with sweeping implications that some in Washington
believe could ultimately trigger class-action lawsuits from thousands of
grieving families.
In
perhaps the most explosive revelation, the expert described a U.S. government
investigation uncovering Chinese Communist Party members holding “golden
shares” in fentanyl-exporting chemical companies.
Speaking
on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of their position, the expert
described to The Bureau the architecture of what they called a
highly sophisticated criminal enterprise with warlike capabilities—an operation
with documented ties to the Chinese state and tentacles spanning multiple
continents. Key figures such as Tse Chi Lop, Xizi Li, and Zhenli Ye Gon—names
that resonate inside federal intelligence and counter-narcotics circles—have
helped construct a resilient command structure for the global fentanyl economy,
coordinating logistics and laundering from urban strongholds including Toronto
and Mexico City.
These
cities, the expert said, serve as operational headquarters for a transnational
machine that moves synthetic opioids by the ton and launders billions in dirty
cash. One key financial artery: Toronto-Dominion Bank.
According
to the expert, investigators have traced how Chinese financiers operating in
Mexico and Canada forged contracts with both Mexican cartels and Chinese
Triads. These deals go far beyond distribution—they underwrite
the entire fentanyl economy, supplying
upfront capital for precursor chemicals, offering financial guarantees, and
embedding insurance-like recovery mechanisms that ensure the supply chain runs
uninterrupted. Once the fentanyl reached street corners and cash began
circulating, the operation turned to an unexpected workforce: Chinese
international students in the United States, enlisted to move funds and help
launder billions.
Working
on student visas, these young couriers were dispatched to discreetly collect
bulk cash from cartel-linked warehouses. From there, the students carried the
money—tightly packed in duffel bags—to TD Bank branches throughout the
Tri-State area of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The process, the
expert said, was clean, compartmentalized, and repeated at scale.
In a
staggering disclosure, the expert explained that fentanyl proceeds don’t simply
vanish into cartel and Triad bank accounts.
The
Chinese brokers who handle the funds carve out their own lucrative
share—laundering “points” that are then parlayed into a sprawling, hidden
economy. That skim alone, the expert said, is vast: loaned out and reinvested
across nearly every sector of the global marketplace—from real estate
developments and shell-company startups to nail salons, massage parlors, and
illicit manufacturing hubs that, over time, blur into the legal architecture of
China’s globalized economic footprint.
At the
top of it all—overseeing a global structure that supplies fentanyl pill
presses, precursor chemicals, dyes, labor, and the laundering infrastructure to
move trillions of dollars over decades—sits Beijing.
“China is
on both ends of the drug trade,” the expert said. “They supply the chemicals,
they control the laundering, and at the very top, you’ve got People’s Republic
of China officials.”
According
to the expert, the intelligence points toward senior Chinese government
officials maintaining financial and operational links to firms producing
synthetic drug precursors, as well as entities managing the flow of laundered
proceeds.
“We’ve
identified Chinese Communist Party members holding golden shares in the
chemical companies shipping precursors out of China,” the source said. “So you
have known CCP members on the board of the fentanyl enterprise. You have known
locations and chemical companies or even production of the fentanyl in prisons
owned by the People’s Republic.”
For some
in Washington, the evidence is powerful enough to warrant a future designation
of the Chinese Communist Party as a transnational drug trafficking
organization—and to trigger sanctions targeting top leaders in Beijing.
Responding
to recent controversy sparked by statements from Canadian officials and
reporting by The Globe and Mail, the expert bluntly rejected claims
that Canada’s role in the North American fentanyl crisis is minimal—an argument
based on low U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seizure numbers along the
northern border.
That
metric, the expert said, is dangerously misleading.
CBP’s
northern data, they explained, does not account for seizures made by the DEA,
FBI, ICE, state and local police, or forces investigating inland trafficking
routes tied directly to Chinese transnational networks operating out of Canada.
Investigations have documented extensive seizures of fentanyl and black-market
marijuana flowing into the U.S.—particularly into the vast Tri-State region,
where Chinese organized crime groups move effortlessly between Ontario and
upstate New York, sharing pill press infrastructure and money laundering
pipelines.
“The
border issue as far as fentanyl, I remember someone reported that it was 1
percent of all the fentanyl seizures, but that's just not true,” the senior
U.S. enforcement overseer said. “That was Customs Border Protection’s number
that they seized. It does not include the number of all the other federal
agencies that work drugs on the border. It did not include the metrics from the
state and local police agencies that work the border. So you're talking about
hundreds of other law enforcement entities that are also seizing drugs coming
down from Canada.”
In one of
the most detailed confirmations yet, the source stated plainly: while major
U.S. banks have also been exposed to Chinese money laundering brokers now
dominating global financial flows for Latin American cartels, TD Bank stood
out.
What made
TD unique, the expert said, was its physical footprint and deep integration
with Chinese community networks in both Toronto and New York—an infrastructure
that proved ideal for laundering massive volumes of fentanyl cash.
It’s a
sensitive conclusion, now circulating at the highest levels in Washington: that
certain cultural norms within diaspora communities—such as large, informal cash
transactions—have inadvertently been weaponized by transnational criminal
networks. And in Canada, where financial institutions operate in cities with
comparatively higher concentrations of Chinese diaspora populations, those
practices appear to have been tolerated, if not outright normalized, by
business managers at senior levels.
“Imagine
if you’ve got a 21-year-old showing up with $3 million, $4 million, $5 million,
$6 million—and you have multiple students now going to the same branch,
dropping off millions of dollars,” the expert said. “There’s not the same sort
of cultural stigma with a bag of cash attached to a Chinese person. It’s like,
‘Okay, well, that’s believable.’ Whereas if I did that, it would set off alarms
everywhere, right?”
The
following is Part 1 of a two-part series based on multiple interviews with a
senior U.S. government figure. This installment focuses on the operational and
financial architecture of Chinese-linked transnational fentanyl networks. Part
2, publishing tomorrow, examines the broader geopolitical stakes of the U.S.
investigation and President Trump’s disruptive tariff offensive. The transcript
has been lightly edited for clarity.
‘There's
so many cross-border criminal groups between the U.S. and Canada that
collaborate’
Sam
Cooper: Thanks for doing this. You know I spoke with Dr. David Asher about
the TD Bank ongoing investigation, and his strong belief that global Chinese
crime leadership and community in Toronto is driving the use of that bank in
the case. And we spoke about the impact of Mexican cartel terror designations
and how that could revolutionize these legal impediments in Canada like Stinchcombe and
the rules that force Canadian police to turn over sources and intelligence to
the gang defense lawyers.
Senior US
Expert: With TD Bank, the thing in
your piece I have been thinking about, is the U.S. banks and how many
U.S. banks have exposure and what they failed to do—and the fact that the
reason why TD has so much exposure is because of where the branches were and
who was laundering money through Chinese organized crime. Listen, the laws in
Canada are clear in your article—your piece with Stinchcombe, Jordan. I
mean, I can tell you this historically: with the DEA Special Ops Division, and
we had the Mounties physically with us—it was the intel side that was there.
They couldn't share the information to the operational side. So here it is. You
have this unbelievable information—investigative information—towards criminal
networks, but you can't really use it.
It
makes no sense. And it was hugely problematic. There's so many cross-border
criminal groups between the U.S. and Canada that collaborate, coordinate daily.
We know this. There's groups that are receiving fentanyl pill press
operations—that are doing this in New York City but are also in Canada. And
they have roots in both countries. And we know this. It's not something where
this is a leader’s conjecture or speculation. No, this is actual investigative
information.
Sam
Cooper: To be clear, these are Chinese groups operating in Ontario
and New York, for example, with no division?
Senior US
Expert: Yes. Think about it like this. In China, everyone thinks,
"Okay, well, chemicals, yes." You think, okay, yes, they're the
biggest precursor chemicals in the world, right? But it's more than just that,
right? They're also, in the U.S. and in Canada, they're amongst the biggest
organizations for money laundering. They're also the biggest organizations for
black market marijuana. They're also integral in setting up these criminal
operations. Let me explain. If I'm receiving fentanyl, whether it's from China
or it's from Mexico, and I want to distribute that on the street, I need a pill
press machine. I need excipients.
I need
binding agents. I need guys. I need all these tools of the trade to be able to
press that kilo with 100, 200, 250,000 pills. That's all coming from China.
Before it
was fentanyl, you could go into most heroin mills, and the glassine bags, the
stamps to market the heroin, the rubber bands—everything—from China. So it was
not only just the most obvious. It's also the stuff that's not so obvious that
the Chinese are involved in. They're way upstream on producing the chemicals.
But also all the tools of the drug trade come from China.
Sam
Cooper: So what this is—China controls the whole fentanyl economy, they
produce the whole factory and it is distributed into North America.
Senior US
Expert: Right. Precisely. And then when you come way down, right—the drugs
getting distributed—and all the money's getting aggregated there too. So
they're on both ends of the drug trade. And who are the Chinese way up at the
absolute top of the enterprise? Guess what—you got People’s Republic of China
officials way up top, and Chinese Communist Party also way down here on the
street. Same thing. So China is on the front end and on the back end of the
entire fentanyl system.
Sam
Cooper: So let me sum this up, what I’ve gathered from experts like David
Asher and yourself, what I heard from an RCMP expert aware of the State
Department’s view, there is a really strong indication that China and the
Chinese Communist Party have a strong influence over Mexican cartels.
Senior US
Expert: Well, the cartels are dependent on China and CCP chemical
production. So there's no question. That's very clear.
Sam
Cooper: David Asher speaks very strongly about US investigative belief
that the command and control for this Western Hemisphere money laundering goes
to Chinese crime in Toronto, and that concerns TD Bank. What do you think about
that?
Senior US
Expert: The lessons that we learned—you talk about TD Bank. TD Bank was
one of the most prolific banks in regards to money laundering in the last
decade, right? The investigation that exposed TD Bank, we have full
understanding of that. A lot was achieved by Special Operations and the New
Jersey Division. Really, New Jersey Division was the lead. But the TD branches
were in New York. Just to give you a little bit of color, Sam. And what we
realized quickly was that branch employees were complicit.
How it
works is that you have these systems within the bank that for their regulatory
compliance, they are filling out some suspicious transactions reports for US
Treasury and FinCEN. But are you really doing compliance? Are you really
looking into the bank, into the branches for criminal exposure? One of the
issues that we noticed is how young students—Asian students—are able to move
millions and millions of dollars through TD. How does a one 22-year-old person
move millions of dollars in cash into a bank? Yes, you'll have a bank that will
say, "We'll issue a suspicious transaction report," but the bank
accounts stay open without a request from law enforcement to look into this
major suspicious activity. They stay open. So that tells me that compliance is
secondary. You follow? And it's not a priority. But $3.1 billion makes it a
priority after the DOJ takes an interest. But what does Canada do on their
side?
Sam
Cooper: The fine from Ministry of Finance is I believe $9 million Canadian
dollars.
[On
May 2, 2024, Canada’s financial intelligence agency Fintrac levied a $9.2
million penalty against TD Bank for major failures in anti-money laundering and
anti-terrorist financing compliance. Violations included failing to report
suspicious transactions, inadequate risk assessments, and neglecting mandatory
safeguards for high-risk clients.]
Senior US
Expert: It's so minimal. How far does that go as far as accountability,
Sam? So think about what that means for those groups in Canada that are
operating through TD.
Sam
Cooper: So to break this down, one, you're saying that bank staff in New
York are complicit in allowing the Chinese students to launder millions, which
by the way, is totally consistent with the casinos in British Columbia. And
you're saying, if I get you right, it would be the managers in Toronto who
would have to care about the suspicious activity reports coming in and saying,
we’ve got to shut that down—and they didn't.
Senior US
Expert: There has to be a higher level of accountability or a higher-level
system, and that's where TD failed. If you see one branch in Flushing, Queens
compared to another—and listen, you are a regional director of these branches
and you know that this is your hottest branch that's bringing in more money
than any other branch—and you're not looking into it. Why? What's going on?
Then that right there—and this is the language that was in the DOJ indictment:
"inadequate compliance." In other words, they did the minimum
compliance, but it was not adequate.
That was
very clearly the problem for TD.
Now,
Sam—and don't get me wrong: U.S. banks are in the same boat. Don't think that
Chase, Wells, BofA don't have exposure in this space. They do. The question is:
where is their compliance? Is their compliance limited to the branch? Are they
looking at it from a regional perspective? Are they trying to build in these
robust compliance programs? I think the issue is you can no longer put that
aside and hope for the best in case the government comes after you. I think
that it's already pivoted. What David Asher told you about criminal charges—I
think that's certainly on the table.
The
designation of the Mexican cartels has transformed what the national security
focus of the United States is going forward. So any industry that ties to those
criminal groups needs to take a hard look at their holdings and their client
base. And keep in mind, there are many organizations—it's not limited to banks,
right? There's transportation companies, there's express mail service
providers. There's a whole host of other industries that have exposure as it
relates to now terrorist groups. Banks are the big one because that's where the
money's at. But any industry that, whether knowingly or unknowingly, is
crossing business with the cartels, they have serious exposure in regards to
terrorist charges and material support charges.
Sam
Cooper: So with regards to the Canadian banks, you had said that it's
their proximity or exposure to senior Chinese organized crime which you believe
makes TD so vulnerable in Toronto?
Post a Comment