Memos of Conversations Between George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin Are Released

Conservative  Treehouse 

Following a series of FOIA lawsuits, memos from conversations between Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and former US President George W. Bush have been released online by the National Security Archive. [Original Source Here]

I know it’s Christmas, but bookmark or review as time allows, because the content is very interesting and very important. As early as 2001 and 2008, President Putin clearly told President Bush of his opposition to Ukraine’s accession to NATO, along with other key positions.

Despite what popular media might say, these are NOT full transcripts. Rather, they are memos containing quotes from both leaders as they discuss geopolitical relations between the U.S. and Russia. [SOURCE HERE]

♦ June 16, 2001 – Memorandum of Conversation. Subject: Restricted Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. [LINK HERE] In this first personal meeting at the Brno Castle in Slovenia Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush express respect for each other and desire to establish a close relationship. Putin tells Bush about his religious beliefs and the story of his cross that survived a fire at his dacha. In a short one-on-one meeting they cover all the most important issues of U.S.-Russian relations such as strategic stability, ABM treaty, nonproliferation, Iran, North Korea and NATO expansion. Bush tells his Russian counterpart that he believes Russia is part of the West and not an enemy, but raises a question about Putin’s treatment of a free press and military actions in Chechnya. Putin raises a question of Russian NATO membership and says Russia feels “left out.” [READ MEMO HERE]

♦ September 16, 2005: Document 2 – Memorandum of Conversation. Subject: Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation: [LINK HERE] Putin meets the U.S. President in the Oval Office for a plenary that covers mainly issues of nonproliferation and U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran and North Korea. The conversation shows impressively close positions on Iran and North Korea, with Putin presenting himself as an eager and supportive partner. Bush tells Putin “we don’t need a lot of religious nuts with nuclear weapons” referring to Iran. Putin said that Ukraine’s accession to NATO would, in the long term, create a field of conflict between Russia and the United States, adding that internal divisions within Ukraine could lead to its fragmentation. [READ MEMO HERE]

♦ April 6, 2008 – Document 3: Memorandum of Conversation. Subject: Meeting with President of Russia [LINK HERE] This is the last meeting between Putin and Bush, taking place at Putin’s residence in Bocharov Ruchei in Sochi on the Black Sea. The tone is strikingly different from the early conversations, where both presidents pledged cooperation on all issues and expressed commitment to strong personal relationship. This meeting takes place right after the NATO summit in Bucharest where tensions flared about the U.S. campaign for an invitation to Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. Turning to conversations in Bucharest, Putin states his strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia and says that Russia would be relying on anti-NATO forces in Ukraine and “creating problems” in Ukraine “all the time,” because it is concerned about “threat of military bases and new military systems being deployed in the proximity of Russia.” Surprisingly, in response, Bush expresses his admiration for the Russian president’s ability to present his case: “One of the things I admire about you is you weren’t afraid to say it to NATO. That’s very admirable. People listened carefully and had no doubt about your position. It was a good performance.” [READ MEMO HERE]

2001 –  Putin raises a question of Russian NATO membership and says Russia feels “left out.”

As noted by The Islander (Via Twitter) –  “The 2001 Memo That Should Have Ended the Cold War 2.0 and Instead Helped Write the Preface to Ukraine. There are documents that don’t merely record history, they expose it. This is one of them.

June 2001. A “restricted meeting” between President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin. Not a podium performance, not a television soundbite, not a speech crafted for domestic applause. A private conversation, the place where empires are supposed to speak plainly, where leaders test ideas that could reroute decades.

And what does the memo show?

Putin raises the idea that Russia could eventually join NATO. He says Russia feels “left out” by NATO enlargement. He points to an older fact most Western publics were never meant to internalize: the Soviet Union applied to join NATO in 1954. He argues the reasons for rejection no longer apply. He suggests, almost clinically, that perhaps Russia could be an ally — “European and multi-ethnic,” comparable in character to the United States.

Read that again slowly.

Because the propaganda version you’ve been fed for years requires amnesia: it requires you to believe Russia woke up one morning and decided to be “a threat,” as if geopolitics is a mood swing and security architecture is irrelevant.

But here is the declassified record: Russia was probing for an exit ramp. A pathway into a shared system. A new security architecture. A post–Cold War settlement that could have turned the 1990s from a hollow victory lap into a durable peace.

And it didn’t happen.

Not because it was impossible. Not because Russia “never wanted it.” Not because “the West tried everything.”

It didn’t happen because NATO, as an institution, does not know how to live without a frontier. It does not know how to justify itself without an adversary. It does not know how to maintain internal cohesion without a map that points east and says: there.

The 1954 Ghost: the offer the West never wanted to remember

The most important part of this memo is not the 2001 line, but the 1954 reference.

Because it collapses the morality play.

If the Soviet Union, a state the West defined as the existential enemy, floated the notion of joining NATO in 1954, that means something profound: the idea of Russia being inside the European security architecture is not a “Putin-era trick.” It is a recurring historical proposal, returning whenever Moscow believes there may be a rational way to avoid permanent confrontation.

And what happened then? It was refused.

Which is exactly the point: NATO was never simply a “defensive alliance.” Even in 1954, It was a structure. A protection racket. A way to organize Europe under an American strategic roof and to keep it there. If Russia enters that roof as an equal, the architecture changes. Budgets decrease, with less money for the MIC. Threat perceptions change. The entire postwar hierarchy changes.

So the West did what empires do when presented with a peace that would reduce their leverage:

It smiled, took notes, and kept moving.

“Join NATO” was never a plea, it was a test.

Some people still misunderstand the early Putin posture. They interpret it as naivete, or worse, submission.

Wrong.

This was not Russia begging to be absorbed. The consistent theme in contemporaneous accounts is conditionality, that Russia could consider joining if treated as an equal partner, but not as a defeated province invited into the emperor’s club after proving it can submit.

That distinction matters.

Because it reveals the real incompatibility:
•Russia wanted a security system where it is a partner of European security, not an object to be managed.
•The Atlantic system wanted Russia as a managed periphery, permanently “integrating,” permanently reforming, permanently conceding, never truly sovereign in security decisions.

You can’t fuse those visions. One side must yield.

So the Atlantic system chose the only thing it has ever really chosen, expansion.”

A quarter century has passed since that original outreach by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin in 2001.  It was rejected by President George W Bush and all presidents thereafter.  In 2025, we are in the phase of consequence.

This public release just happened on December 23, 2025.

Perhaps, just perhaps, this release can change the conversation in the United States.  Perhaps, just perhaps, President Trump, Secretary Rubio and Emissary Witkoff can reverse the course, and change the arc of history toward peace and a strategic alliance.

The timing of the release inspires hope, but the opposition to peace is extreme.