Mired Down in War: Should Ukraine Surrender?
The Russo-Ukrainian War shows no signs of winding down. Since the Alaska Summit and the follow-on confab of European and American leadership in Washington, Tsar Vladimir I has dashed all hope of a cease-fire by stepping up attacks, including the largest air attack to date, involving ballistic and cruise missiles as well as hundreds of drones.
Ukraine, under President Zelensky, appears to be willing to fight on. That's causing some to ask, "For how long? To what end?" There's one thing most geopolitical and military analysts seem to (reluctantly, in some cases) agree on: Ukraine can't win a war with Russia. The best that Ukraine may be able to hope for is a negotiated peace without having to give up too much land. Until recently, I would have said the best they could hope for is a return to the status quo ante 2022, in which Russia keeps Crimea and Ukraine keeps the Donbas and other territories now under Russian boots.
Now, even that seems unlikely. That's leading some to ask if it wouldn't be better for Ukraine to admit defeat, to make what deal they can.
History, we are told, is written by the victors. Yet in Ukraine, the story may end up being written by those clever enough to redefine what ‘victory’ looks like.
Two tribes have been shouting across Western commentary trenches since 2022. On one side sit the realists, like John Mearsheimer, shrugging that Russia was provoked and that Ukraine must accept the grim realpolitik of geography. On the other side perch the idealists, like Matthew Syed, wagging fingers that anything short of total victory is appeasement.
We'll deal with the idealists another time. Besides, no matter what the idealists may think, Ukraine can't win "total victory" over Russia. Not alone. No matter how many weapons and munitions Europe supplies, it simply doesn't have the manpower.
But surrender?
Let’s be blunt. Defeating Russia outright is fantasy. Ukraine has fought valiantly, but Western support is flagging. European unity is a mirage. Germany still buys Russian gas under the table; since the war began, Europe has sent over $250 billion to Moscow for oil and gas. That’s not strategy. It’s self‑harm and hypocrisy masquerading as policy.
Ukraine's problem is simple: They're running out of young men. There was a saying in the American Civil War, during which wealthy men could pay for an exemption to the draft, to note that it was an "old man's war but a young man's fight." It is that cohort, young men, usually from 17 to 30 years of age, who are on the sharp end of the stick. T'was ever thus, and always will be. Why? Because they're young enough to stand it. I spent some time in infantry outfits for a while when I was in that age range, but if you asked me to engage in activity I took for granted back then, now, that I'm in my mid-sixties, well, I'd have a hell of a time keeping up.
All the weapons, all the vehicles, all the logistics, all the support in the world isn't worth a hill of beans if you run out of young men to fire the weapons, drive the vehicles, bring the logistics forward, and so on.
The rest of Europe, also, isn't going to keep those weapons coming forever.
Even NATO only began digging into defence budgets once Trump, uncouth and ill‑mannered but in this case both ethically and pragmatically correct, bullied Europe into paying its dues. The alliance has been shamed into adulthood by the political equivalent of a Casino Don.
I'm not at all certain that President Trump wouldn't accept that characterization as a kind of back-handed flattery. But that's as may be. Yes, President Trump shamed Europe into stepping up, and NATO's Secretary General has lauded him for it. But weapons and munitions stocks aren't a cornucopia. And speaking of those young men that are being called on to wield these weapons, their family members appear to be getting tired of the whole thing.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s spirit is fraying. A Gallup poll in July 2025 found that just 24% still support fighting until victory, while 69% now favour a negotiated peace. That marks a near‑complete reversal from 2022, when 73% backed victory and just 22% desired talks. Zelensky’s approval, once north of 80%, now hovers around the mid‑60s. Not desperate, but no longer heroic.
But surrender? Author Clive Pinder writes of a possible dramatic turnabout for post-war Ukraine:
Imagine a Marshall Plan 2.0, funded by frozen Russian assets, redirected European subsidies and reform‑tied loans. Instead of smouldering weaponry, NATO should funnel that money into digital infrastructure, schools, start-ups.
Enter Estonia on steroids. Estonia’s GDP per capita leapt from $3,435 in 1991 to about $32,460 by 2023. Today, GDP per capita is around $31,855. Its economy is high‑income, advanced and resilient. Its ICT sector contributes over 7% of GDP, attracting €1.3 billion in tech investments in 2022. In digital public services, Estonia leads the EU. 89% of citizens use e‑government. Over half the electorate now votes online and it all works so smoothly it makes our elections look like they’re run by blokes with clipboards and carrier pigeons
Ukraine, brimming with tech‑savvy youth, fertile fields and room to grow, could scale this model 10-fold. Build a liberal, high‑growth democracy whose skyscrapers, start-ups and liberties shine across the border shouting ‘This is what you could have had, had you not been stuck with kleptocracy and fear’.
That’s the existential threat Putin fears. What keeps him awake isn’t NATO armour. It’s an Estonia where work, healthcare, banking and elections run on apps while Russia still runs on bribes and babushkas.
And that's where I think the whole argument comes apart.
First, the Marshall Plan was conceived and carried out in no small part to restore Europe as a major economic consumer of American goods; we had a vested interest in that. But Ukraine alone won't be a major consumer base.
Second, it's not as though Ukraine, the United States, NATO, the European Commission, or anyone else can just look around for frozen Russian assets and say, "Oh, look, let's take those, and give them to Ukraine." There are legal issues around such a seizure that may take years to unwind. And is NATO just going to pour money into a nation that was once derided as having one of the most corrupt governments, the most corrupt economies in Europe? Have we forgotten Burisma already?
Third, even if all this works, even if Ukraine becomes, somehow, the Eastern European version of Silicon Valley - unlikely in the extreme - Tsar Vladimir I is just as likely to attempt to seize a richer Ukraine as to seek to emulate it.
In other words, while this thing can't go on forever, and while I would argue it really can't go on for much longer, surrender isn't the best option. Russia, while they have many more young men and a lot of equipment, can't carry this on forever. The stepped-up attacks by Russia on Ukraine may be some sign that Putin is getting some hot flashes, that powers in Russia, in Moscow, are pushing him to wrap this thing up.
The likely end is becoming apparent. Ukraine will never get Crimea back. They are likely going to have to surrender some, if not all, of Donbas. In return, they get peace - for a while. It's a peace they should spend preparing for the next Russian attack, because it's much more likely to be a reprieve than a permanent condition, at least until Tsar Vladimir I shuffles off the mortal coil.
Post a Comment