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China's Rhineland test in the South China Sea



Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is enabling the Chinese Communist Party to do in the South China Sea what Nazi Germany did with its remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 — that is to say, physically challenge the established international order in a politically potent manner.

The consequences for America, the South China Sea rim nations, and the broader international community may be significant.

At contention is the Chinese maritime militia force that has moored itself within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. The approximately 200 vessels have been sitting in Whitsun Reef since late March. In 2016, an international maritime arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines' sovereignty over the Spratly chain of which Whitsun Reef is a part. Still, China insists it owns the South China Sea. This geographic absurdity serves China's imperial effort to make itself into a 21st-century version of 1930s/1940s Japan — a power that is able to dictate political concessions from other nations in return for their access to the multitrillion-dollar trade flows that move through these waters.

The Rhineland comparison takes root in the fact that, as with China in this situation, Nazi Germany's incursion was ultimately designed to test whether Britain and France would back up their claims with action. They did not. With regards to the Whitsun Reef, America's problem is that the Philippines is a treaty ally led by an anti-American clown. Apparently determined to follow in German Chancellor Angela Merkel's footsteps and win China's order of friendship at all costs, Duterte is unwilling to defend his nation's interests. The degree to which Duterte gleefully appeases China's aggression is truly striking. Consider, for example, that the supposedly strongman president has transformed his navy into a glorified beach patrol.

So, while the U.S. and the Philippine defense establishments recognize the import of China's incursion, their hands are tied. Their long-standing mutual defense treaty is caught between China's bold incursion and the messy place of Duterte's mind.

China was banking on this tension. This deployment is almost certainly a design of Chinese President Xi Jinping's foreign policy brain, Yang Jiechi. Yang wants to undermine the Biden administration as it seeks to strengthen alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. It wants to show that America's "free and open Indo-Pacific" is as rhetoric-thin as was the Treaty of Versailles.

Smarter than the Nazis, the Chinese communists are playing a longer game. They claim that their militia vessels are fishing trawlers that are simply taking temporary shelter. The Chinese know that the United States and the Philippines know that this claim is a lie (the weather is fine and will remain so for the near future), but the fishing veil offers a useful excuse for the European Union to avoid supporting their allies in favor of "seeking clarity," etc. Regardless, because the militia vessels have been asked to leave but have not done so, China can credibly present the Biden administration as hesitant. It hopes that regional powers such as Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and even India will take notice and question whether the U.S. is really all that reliable. If nothing else, it has a new reason to be confident that future antics such as this one will go unchallenged. To be clear, China does not want a shooting war. What it wants is to foster an acceptance of its omnipotent possession of the South China Sea, gradually but systemically. Its Whitsun Reef test advances that agenda.

The Biden administration faces a very difficult choice.

The Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group is operating in the South China Sea, as is the Makin Island amphibious assault ship (Makin Island is embarked with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which includes a detachment of F-35B fighter jets). But with Duterte unwilling to demand China's relocation of the militia fleet and unwilling to enforce that withdrawal with his own military, the U.S. Navy is generally impotent here. Beijing is likely confident that the U.S. will not escalate in support of an ally if that ally is unwilling to defend its own interests. They'll be equally confident that Duterte won't change tack in a significant matter.

At least until Duterte leaves office, China will continue to exploit him. But Beijing will hope that the corrosive impact of this crisis sustains far beyond Duterte's premiership. Again, this is to the South China Sea what the Nazis' 1936 seizure of the Rhineland was to European security: a risky military test carrying profound political implications. Genocide, it seems, is not the only area in which China finds an example from the Nazis.