If there is one lesson that Putin’s War, that is, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, should have taught us, it is that it is no longer possible to think of Russia as a member of any security or economic system. Russia has proven itself to be a rogue actor with no regard for other nations’ rights and, in the best Tsarist tradition, sees treaties as an illegal infringement upon its freedom of action that it only signs out of weakness and breaks at the first opportune moment.
After seeing this behavior grow since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, NATO has finally bowed to the obvious. It must prepare for another Cold War to restrain Russia and protect weaker nations from its depredations and terrorism. The Washington Post provides color commentary and background in a story headlined U.S., allies plan for long-term isolation of Russia.
At NATO and the European Union, and at the State Department, the Pentagon and allied ministries, blueprints are being drawn up to enshrine new policies across virtually every aspect of the West’s posture toward Moscow, from defense and finance to trade and international diplomacy.
Outrage is most immediately directed at Putin himself, who President Biden said last month “can’t remain in power.” While “we don’t say regime change,” said a senior E.U. diplomat, “it is difficult to imagine a stable scenario with Putin acting the way he is.”
But the nascent new strategy goes far beyond the Kremlin leader, as planners are continuing to revise seminal documents that are to be presented in the coming months. Biden’s first National Security Strategy, legally required last year but still uncompleted, is likely to be significantly altered from initial expectations it would concentrate almost exclusively on China and domestic renewal. The Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy, sent last month in classified form to Congress, prioritizes what a brief Pentagon summary called “the Russia challenge in Europe,” as well as the China threat.
While this break was probably coming anyway, Putin’s War has brought into more precise focus the nature of Putin’s Russia.
But the long-term strategy is being drawn up even as the allies address the immediate crisis with escalating sanctions against Moscow, weapons aid to Ukraine, and the deployment of tens of thousands of their own troops to NATO’s eastern border. Many of those measures and more are now expected to stay permanently in place, according to public leader statements and conversations with eight senior U.S. and foreign officials, some of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss closed-door planning.
“At the end of the day, what we want to see is a free and independent Ukraine, a weakened and isolated Russia and a stronger, more unified, more determined West,” Biden national security adviser Jake Sullivan said last Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press.” “We believe that all three of those objectives are in sight.”
There has also been a strategic reordering within NATO. Eastern Europe is showing leadership and initiative no matter how much the aging communists running Germany want to apply the brakes. Poland has emerged as the leader of the states most at risk from Russian aggression. Russia’s actions have virtually assured that Finland and Sweden will become NATO members this summer. Russia’s behavior has given most of NATO a new focus and a new reason to exist.
A senior European official said that “the one lesson we take away from a Russian aggression that many thought could not be possible, is that here is a country that is ready to do something that no security guarantee or even plausible expectation [can ensure] that it can’t happen again.”
“We thought interdependence, connectiveness, would be conducive to stability because we had correlating interests. Now, we’ve seen this is not the case. Russia was highly connected with Europe, a globalized country.” the official said. “Interdependence, we’ve now seen, can entail severe risks, if a country is ruthless enough. … We have to adapt to a situation that is absolutely new.”
Several European policymakers said their current calculations are shaped by two major factors. The first is the expectation that any truce in Ukraine is likely to be temporary. Even if Putin agrees to lay down arms for the moment, many Europeans believe he will seek to regroup, rebuild the Russian military and attack again once he feels ready.
The actions of the Russian Army in Ukraine will make it very difficult for even the weak sisters like France and Germany to ignore the new arrangement.
The second is a deep horror at the Russian military’s atrocities against civilians that have come to light since its forces pulled back toward eastern Ukraine in the past two weeks. Many believe Putin himself may need to face war crimes charges in front of international tribunals.
Imagining Putin brought to account for his crimes is a cheery thought but a silly one. It isn’t going to happen. However, what can happen is Interpol Red Notices filed on the commanders of Russian units known to have been stationed in areas where war crimes were discovered. Under precedent established in the Far East war crimes tribunals, it isn’t necessary that a commander order criminal acts to be convicted, all that is necessary to prove is that the crimes took place and he neither investigated nor prosecuted the culprits. Facial recognition software (see Ukraine Using Facial Recognition Software to Identify Dead Russians and Tell Their Families) makes it possible to identify Russian soldiers in videos and images containing potential war crimes and link them to a unit.
We can’t plausibly maintain a situation where Russia is both a trading partner with the West and, at the same time, insists that it has a “right’ to a “sphere of influence” that lets it establish the foreign and domestic policy of smaller states that border it. If Russia wishes to engage in commercial and cultural exchange with the West, it must put aside its self-delusion that its aging nuclear arsenal gives it importance. If it doesn’t, then it’s welcome to become a Chinese fiefdom with all that will entail.