Dead and frozen Soviet soldiers in the snow, and some of the guns and equipment left by the fleeing Soviet troops, at Soumussalmi, Finland, December 1939, after a big battle in what became known as the Winter War. After Soviet troops directed by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin attacked Finland, Finnish troops were able to repel troops who were not expecting and thus ill-prepared for determined resistance. Although Finland later fell, it retained its statehood (over diminished territory and after accepting other degrading terms).
Article by Richard Elliott in cleveland.com
Six lessons from Stalin’s Finland invasion that offer clues on Putin and Ukraine
As Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine unfolds, there are lessons to be drawn from a prior Moscow dictator’s invasion of a weak, inoffensive, sovereign neighbor. Putin certainly remembers this history, now that his delusions of Ukrainian collapse have been dashed.
Josef Stalin’s cynical 1939 deal with Adolf Hitler empowered him to intimidate Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into surrendering control to the Soviet Union, and to seize eastern Poland. These successes emboldened him to try the same tactics on Finland that had worked on the three Baltic states. His designed-to-be-rejected ultimatum demanded huge territories and military bases, which would have left Finland helpless, and likely soon swallowed-up. Putin’s demands now on Ukraine have the same flavor.
In November 1939, seemingly irresistible Soviet armies attacked across Finland’s border, launching what is called the Winter War. What can we learn from that war?
First, Goliath can be stopped, at least for a while, as we have seen in Ukraine. Stalin’s initial invasion failed miserably. Despite massively more infantry, war planes, tanks and artillery than the Finns, the Red Army was stopped cold not far from the border near Leningrad. More northerly columns were stopped, then shredded, by Finnish ski troops.
Second, Goliath eventually prevails if willing to pay a high enough price. New commanders and even larger Soviet forces attacked again … and broke the Finnish defenses, despite military supplies and equipment sent by sympathetic governments. A better-organized offensive incurring enormous Soviet casualties ground the Finns down to the breaking point. The Finnish government was compelled to sue for peace in March 1940, accepting terms even harder than originally demanded.
Third, a botched invasion doesn’t mean the invading military is as weak as it appears. Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 at least partly because he, and many others, believed that the Winter War demonstrated both abysmal incompetence and deep demoralization in the Red Army. There was some truth in this belief, but Hitler learned to his cost that Soviet military resources and will were far larger and more robust than the Winter War seemed to show.
Fourth, strong initial resistance benefited Finland despite its eventual defeat. Stalin took territory and bases, but didn’t swallow the country whole in 1940. Nor did he insist that Finns accept the new puppet government he had created in captured territory early in the war.
Fifth, a crushed neighbor doesn’t necessarily stay crushed. In 1941, the Finns attacked to retake territories lost the prior year, in parallel with the massive German invasion of Russia, Operation Barbarossa. The Finns termed this the Continuation War. Despite German pressure, they stopped at the old border and refused to attack or bombard German-besieged Leningrad.
Finally, sometimes bloody dictators keep their word. Believing Finland’s promises of strict postwar neutrality, at the end of the World War II, Stalin retook his gains from the Winter War (plus massive reparations), but never forced Finland into his collection of Eastern European satellite states.
Absent NATO’s direct entry into this current Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the day may come when Ukraine, like Finland, may be forced to accept some negotiated peace – a horrible, debilitating, and currently unacceptable one. The alternative may be complete occupation by Russia, and bloody partisan warfare.
Would Putin keep his word, if Ukraine and the West agreed to such a peace? Or would such a deal repeat the Munich Agreement’s “Peace for our time,” providing Putin a respite to prepare more aggression? Ukraine and NATO may have to make this judgment down the road. Stalin’s precedent offers some hope -- but Putin’s record is poor.
