Report says Taiwanese gang members were instructed to raise the Chinese five-star flag during a potential invasion as a signal of cooperation.
TAIPEI, Taiwan — Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has revealed a stunning report on Beijing’s use of organized crime to infiltrate the island’s military, corrupt officials, and establish traitorous ground forces ahead of a potential invasion.
Released on January 12, the detailed intelligence report marks a significant increase in transparency from the Taiwanese government, spotlighting Beijing’s methods of leveraging criminal networks for infiltration. While this candor risks diplomatic fallout, it underscores the urgency Taiwan seeks to convey.
The findings document a surge in espionage efforts, including the covert recruitment of Taiwanese nationals—particularly military personnel—and the use of organized crime, underground financial networks, and civic or religious groups to extract sensitive government information. Accompanied by data tables and graphics, the report frames these operations as part of Beijing’s "united front work," orchestrated by China’s state security and intelligence agencies.
Under the heading “Colluding with gang groups to develop internal armed co-optees,” the report states that China has reportedly recruited Taiwanese gang members, offering debt relief to servicemembers in financial distress in exchange for sensitive military intelligence.
It further reveals that gang members were instructed to raise the Chinese five-star flag during a potential invasion as a signal of cooperation. According to the report, operatives also exploited underground financial networks tied to gang groups to funnel funds into Taiwan. Veterans were allegedly tasked with compiling rosters of high-ranking military officers and mapping key sites, such as foreign embassies, radar stations, and joint training bases. Some were organized into "sniper teams" charged with planning sabotage missions.
Election cycles provide another point of vulnerability. Beijing has reportedly funded all-expenses-paid trips for Taiwanese politicians to China, conditioning their support for specific candidates on these visits. This practice aligns with frequent allegations of meddling by United Front organizations tied to Fujian province, a region on China’s coast known for both organized crime and intelligence operations.
One high-profile case, according to Taiwanese media reports, encapsulates the severity of the situation: prosecutors charged the founder of the Fukang Alliance Party and six retired military officers with supplying photographs and GPS coordinates of military installations to China. Although the party fielded candidates in Taiwan’s 2024 legislative elections, none won seats. Authorities allege that the group received funding from the PRC, leading to charges under Taiwan’s national security laws.
Beyond these on-the-ground activities, social media has emerged as a critical battleground. Platforms including Facebook, LINE, and LinkedIn allow Chinese-linked recruiters to reach financially distressed targets, commonly transferring funds via cryptocurrencies to blur their trail. Once individuals are roped in, they can be deployed to help expand decentralized espionage networks that pervade multiple layers of Taiwanese society.
The National Security Bureau’s report notes a sharp rise in espionage prosecutions over the last few years, with cases increasing from three in 2021 to 14 in 2023—a total that involved 48 people. By 2024, prosecutions climbed to 15, with 64 individuals indicted. These figures omit cases charged under Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act, indicating that the overall scale of infiltration likely extends further than official numbers suggest.
Economic hardship is a recurring vulnerability, illustrated by the fact that 15 veterans and 28 active-duty troops accounted for a majority of indictments in 2024 alone. Investigators emphasize that debt, gambling problems, and other financial pressures create avenues for exploitation, especially when people have access to sensitive military details.
According to the report, five major channels drive these infiltration efforts: criminal gangs, underground banks, front companies, temples, and local associations. Gang networks promise to wipe out debts in exchange for government intelligence, while underground banks under PRC control lure participants into deeper collaboration. Temples and religious organizations funded by Beijing provide a veneer of community and tradition but can be used to recruit and coerce servicemembers into divulging secret information.
In 2024, Beijing’s disinformation campaigns have escalated, the report says, using hybrid methods to sow division in Taiwan by spreading narratives such as “U.S. skeptic,” “military skeptic,” and “Lai skeptic.” These efforts aim to erode trust in the government and deepen social fractures.
To combat these efforts, Taiwan has implemented a “whole-of-government” mechanism for real-time reporting and coordinated responses to cognitive warfare threats. In 2024 alone, over 3,900 instances of disinformation were reported to government ministries and departments to aid response planning. Additionally, the National Security Bureau has shared its expertise on countering disinformation with like-minded countries through more than 100 international exchange activities, helping the global democratic community build resilience against authoritarian cognitive warfare.
U.S. law enforcement and Congressional reports indicate these tactics are not unique to Taiwan. American lawmakers have highlighted Beijing’s use of organized crime, election interference, influence campaigns, and so-called Chinese Communist Party police stations to target diaspora communities and undermine democratic institutions.
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